Before the acceptance of neurological criteria for human death in the late 1960s and 1970s leading to Donation after Brain Death (DBD), early organ donation from deceased patients can be characterized as proceeding similar to current protocols for Donation after Circulatory Death (DCD). 1 In DCD, death is diagnosed using cardio-respiratory criteria, satisfaction of which confirms that the circulation of the patient has ceased. Whilst these are the same criteria that doctors use to determine whether or not death has occurred in most other environments, in the context of organ donation there is pressure to pronounce death as soon as possible. The reason for this is that the cessation of circulation causes warm ischaemic damage to organs, meaning that their suitability for transplantation rapidly falls (within 20 min, e.g. in the liver). Successful DCD requires the shortest period from circulatory cessation to organ recovery. National guidelines therefore recommend a minimum of 2-20 min (e.g. USA, 2 min; UK, 5 min; Italy, 20 min) wait following cardio-respiratory arrest before doctors should declare death. 2 In the context of DCD the determination of death raises a particular ethical issue and a potential conflict of interests between the dying patient and the organ recipient. Thus, both for clinical and ethical reasons, DBD became the preferred approach to organ retrieval with DCD becoming so neglected as to be something of a rarity. Nevertheless, because of the worldwide shortage of transplant organs and the fact that patients, families and professionals began advocating for the development and adoption of protocols for DCD, it has seen an international resurgence over the last two decades. At present, up to 10% of worldwide deceased donations result from DCD. 4 In the UK the predominant type of DCD is controlled DCD which accounts for 40% of all deceased organ donation. 5 Controlled DCD typically involves a mechanically ventilated patient in intensive care with overwhelming single organ failure, usually the brain. With the family's agreement, a decision is made to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. If the patient is medically suitable, consent for organ donation is sought from the family, taking into account any wish expressed on organ donation registers. If consent to donation is gained a surgical retrieval team is mobilized to the donating hospital and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment only commences once the surgical team is prepared in theatre and recipients for the organs have been identified. This type of DCD is considered to be 'controlled' because there is some ability to predict and plan for imminent circulatory cessation. Upon the withdrawal of lifesustaining treatment, if cardio-respiratory arrest occurs within a few hours (3 h in the UK), DCD may be possible once death has been diagnosed.
Philosophical criticism
Concern has been expressed in the medical and philosophical literature that in DCD the donor 'may not be dead' at the time of organ recovery, thus violating the dead donor rule (DDR). [6] [7] [8] [9] The DDR, prohibits organ recovery before death. The concern is that if organ recovery commences at just a few minutes after cardiorespiratory arrest, than we cannot know that the circulatory cessation is irreversible. In some cases, we might still be able to restart the heart by cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or other human action. That death should be irreversible appears self-evident and is written into many statutes. For example, in the USA the Uniform Determination of Death Act 1981 (UDDA) provides that 'An individual who has sustained either (i) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (ii) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead'.
One response to this criticism has been to claim 'irreversible' means 'permanent' and to adopt a normative definition of irreversibility. 10, 11 It might be biologically true that five minutes after cardio-respiratory arrest attempts at CPR might be successful but patients on a DCD pathway have a Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation Order (DNA CPR) and therefore there is no intention, and indeed it is ethically prohibited, to attempt this action. Since CPR is the only way the circulation could be restarted, and CPR is not going to occur, cessation is permanent so the patient can be declared dead.
Critics retort that death is not normative but biological. It is not enough for circulatory-respiratory function to have ceased permanently-it needs to be 'biologically' incapable of restarting.
Nevertheless, the term 'irreversible' remains ambiguous, even on a purely biological account. 12 It can mean 'either' or 'both' of two things:
i. not capable of being resuscitated by CPR or other human action; or ii. not capable of spontaneous auto-resuscitation.
Following cardio-respiratory arrest the heart might restart as a result of human efforts, such as CPR, or it may do so of its own accord (auto-resuscitation). It is to prevent the possibility of auto-resuscitation that national guidelines recommend a minimum wait time for doctors before declaring death. The 5-minute standard was originally proposed by Eugene Bouchut in 1846 as a means of preventing premature burials. 13 Modern evidence suggests that waiting as little as 2 min may be sufficient to prevent the possibility of auto-resuscitation following the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment, 14 although in situations of failed CPR waiting for a longer period (5-7 min) may be warranted. 15 Regardless, the point we are making is that autoresuscitation is tied to a biological definition of irreversibility. Furthermore, if 'both' auto-resuscitation and resuscitation by human action must be impossible before death can be declared, it remains unclear how long doctors should wait. Should the time of death's irreversibility be tied to the time at which the human action of CPR-or other resuscitative technologies such as extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO)-would fail? 16 If so, might we need to readjust the wait time every time there is a medical breakthrough? At present there are a wide range of times -from minutes to 'several hours'-before we can be certain that an individual can no longer be returned to life by human intervention. 14, 17, 18 Finally, consider the hopes of those involved in post-mortem cryogenics. At minimum it would seem that a biological account of irreversibility is tied to our current knowledge and technological abilities. These facts justify a practical distinction between patients for whom CPR (or other human action) is appropriate and those for whom it is not. After waiting for the possibility of autoresuscitation to pass, doctors should not need to wait for another, 'second' period of time to pass where that period of time is only required in order to rule out the possibility of successful CPR. 12, 16 The circulation has stopped, we know it will not be restored through auto-resuscitation, and we know that resuscitation by human action is not allowed: so we know all we need to know to declare death. 16 Although this conclusion remains debatable there is no denying that DCD justifies its adherence to the DDR only by its satisfaction of death as permanence. We might then consider how well the current practice of DCD satisfies the standard of permanence.
Permanence and typical controlled DCD
A UK consensus meeting discussed the theoretical possibility that auto-resuscitation could occur in a typical controlled DCD, either spontaneously, or from actions that might inadvertently mimic CPR (e.g. patient movement during transfer to the operating theatre or vigorous intraabdominal organ retrieval that might theoretically compress and restart the heart). 19 Since the year 2000 there have been over 4000 controlled DCDs in the UK, with no published or anecdotal reports of auto-resuscitation occurring using a five minute wait time after circulatory cessation. 5 Worldwide a similar picture emerges, including in the USA with even higher DCD numbers. This suggests that in controlled DCD auto-resuscitation is extremely unlikely.
Permanence and heart DCD
The development of formal protocols for DCD was initially intended to facilitate the procurement of kidneys for transplantation, but its use has rapidly been expanded to the retrieval of other organs including lung, liver, pancreas and, more recently, hearts. There has also been an expansion into other patient populations such as uncontrolled DCD. These special circumstances create new challenges in DCD with regard to respecting the DDR. In what follows, we shall focus exclusively on DCD heart transplantation, as the newest, and perhaps most challenging, development in this field. Current heart DCD practice uses two main techniques. The first involves placing the heart in an organ transport box after removal, where oxygenated blood is perfused to the isolated heart to stimulate it to commence contraction. This allows the heart to be assessed and transported in a manner that avoids any further damage that would result if it was transported by the traditional method-i.e. non-beating in ice. Some have criticized this technique, and heart DCD transplantation in general, as it appears to contravene the notion of death as being the irreversible and permanent cessation of circulatory function, since the heart regains function. 20, 21 Indeed, the alternative phraseology for DCD (common in the USA) is Donation after 'Cardiac' Death, which appears to suggest a paradox whereby a dead heart becomes alive again. This argument seems weak, however, even in the jurisdictions of the criticism. The UDDA confirms death as it relates to an individual not their body part and a similar law in Australia states very clearly it is 'irreversible cessation of "circulation" of blood "in a person's body"'. 22 Further, as noted above, the impossibility of resuscitation by human action is not the applicable standard for declaring death in these donors. The second main technique used for some heart DCD cases in the UK offers a somewhat different challenge to the standard of permanence. 18 In this technique ECMO is commenced in the body of the donor after the declaration of death but the perfusion is regionally isolated to all parts of the body except the brain and upper limbs by virtue of a surgical cross clamp placed across the arterial vessels emerging from the arch of the aorta. Once ECMO circulation commences, the heart will begin to contract within a few minutes, allowing detailed assessment of function, optimisation if required and removal with proposed less warm ischaemic damage. As recently argued this is to attempt to respect permanence only as it applies to the cerebral circulation (provided the clamp is fully effective in isolating the cerebral circulation) not as it applies to the heart and circulation within the rest of the body. 23 Although this defence of permanence might be strong and in keeping with previous efforts 10 it does suggest that the law in the USA and Australia might need to be modified to allow DCD hearts to be recovered. In both jurisdictions a statutory criterion for death is 'irreversible' cessation of circulation and, using this technique, the circulation is restored artificially in the body. There does not seem to be a similar requirement to change the law in the UK where no such statute exists. In contrast the various Codes of Practice for declaring death in the UK, since the 1970s have upheld the view that whatever the mode of its production, either due to intracranial or extra-cranial events, irreversible (perhaps normatively defined) cessation of brain-stem function represents the stage at which a patient becomes truly dead. 24 
Conclusion
Donation after Circulatory Death is a success story. It has meant that many thousands of patients have been able to donate organs after their death in accordance with their end of life wishes. From that altruism many thousands of patients have had their lives saved or otherwise benefited. While debated by some, the DDR remains inviolate in organ donation policy. It is therefore important to tackle questions that challenge whether donors are really dead at the time of donation. DCD practice relies on a definition of irreversible cessation of circulatory, respiratory and neurological functions that is partly normative. This article argues that the standard of declaring death based on the time at which resuscitative efforts would be futile is not applicable where resuscitative efforts are expressly ruled out, so we need only wait for the possibility of auto-resuscitation to pass. At this point, the heart has stopped, we know it cannot auto-resuscitate, and we know that resuscitation by human action (CPR or ECMO) will not be allowed: so we know all we need to know to declare death.
Typical controlled DCD satisfies this standard. Special circumstances in DCD, such as heart DCD, require particular care, especially to ensure that the cerebral circulation is never restored. For some jurisdictions this might require the redrafting of statutes, to make it clear that what is ruled out is restarting circulation in the brain. With appropriate safeguards DCD will continue to be safe and respectful to all who wish to make this gift after death.
